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AGENCY
Robert A. Pascal*
The deficiency of our written law in matters of undisclosed
agency became evident once again in Sentell v. Richardson.1 Sentell
asked Richardson to buy stock for him, without revealing he was
acting for anyone else, and then to transfer the stock to Sentell.
Richardson agreed, negotiated for the stock and notified Sentell,
who gave him a check for the price before the stock certificate was
endorsed over to Richardson. On the same day Richardson notified
Sentell of his withdrawal from the contract and of his intention to
buy the stock for himself. Richardson paid for the stock with his
own funds, obtained the stock- certificate, and then sold the stock
to Martin. Sentell sued Richardson and Martin.' Sentell claimed
Richardson was his "agent" when he completed negotiations for the
stock and hence that Sentell at that time became owner of the stock
and Richardson powerless to sell it. Richardson pleaded alternative
defenses. Either his contract with Sentell was not a "mandate or
procuration" (which is gratuitous)' and therefore invalid for lack
of "consideration"; or, if mandate, he was privileged to renounce it
under Article 3031 of the Civil Code.'
The opinion of the court is no less interesting than the conten-
tions of the defendant. Chief Justice O'Niell declared the contract
a mandate, denying that representation, or action in the name of
another, is essential to mandate, Article 2985 notwithstanding. This
view is the subject of a note to be published in the review5 and will
not be discussed here at length. Suffice it here to say that neither
the Civil Code nor any other legislation provides for non-representa-
tive or undisclosed agency and that only three courses of action
would have been open to the court. It might have treated acts of
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 288, 29 So. (2d) 852 (1947).
2. Martin claimed he was owner of the stock under the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, La. Act 180 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. §§ 1180-1205], having purchased
same in good faith from an indorsee of the stock certificate. The supreme court
found the evidence did not support his allegation of good faith.
3. Art. 2991, La. Civil Code of 1870:
"The procuration is gratuitous unless there has been a contrary agreement."
4. Art. 3031, La. Civil Code of 1870:
"The attorney may renounce his power of attorney by notifying to the prin-
cipal his renunciation.
"Nevertheless, if this renunciation be prejudicial to the principal, he ought
to be indemnified by the agent, unless the latter should be so situated that he
can not continue the agency without considerable injury."
5. (1948) Volume VIII, No. 3.
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undisclosed agency as involving two separate contracts, one between
principal and agent and another between agent and third party
contracting with the agent. This analysis would result in legal re-
lations between principal and agent and between agent and third
party, but never between principal and third party. This was the
solution reached by French jurisprudence, there being no French
legislation sanctioning non-representative or undisclosed agency in
civil, as distinguished from commercial, matters! Or, the court
might have followed the same procedure employed in previous
cases, that of following the common law. This method is non-
civilian, but we have operated under it, and common law does allow
recovery between principal and third party in undisclosed agency."
Or, the court could, as it did, deny the essential difference between
mandate and undisclosed agency. This approach is little less than
outright judicial reform of the law, but it has the practical advan-
tage of giving an appearance of legislative or textual basis to our
law of non-representative agency!
The absence of legislation on undisclosed or non-representative
agency is possibly more than a mere oversight. The civil law never
developed the trust theory which, if not the basis of action between
principal and third party in such cases at common law, is similar
in character. The common law alone developed the idea that prin-
cipal-third party relations flow from non-representative agency.
The civil law tradition found difficulty admitting legal relations
between principal and third party even in representative agency or
mandate9 and does so here only on the theory of privity between
these parties.
The second contention of the defendant, that an agent may
effectively renounce his agency at any time, involves another
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Having once found the contract between Sentell and Richardson to be one
of mandate, the contention of the defendant that the contract was void for lack
of "consideration" became unimportant. The opinion, however, nevertheless under-
takes to find a "consideration." It is unfortunate that both the bar and bench
of our state continue to speak of consideration, a purely common law concept
and requirement without any basis whatsoever in our law of contracts. Our law
does not require mutuality of obligation in contracts in general. Art. 1765, La.
Civil Code of 1870. And even where there are mutual obligations, these obliga-
tions need not be in the nature of exchanged values. Arts. 1767-1770, La. Civil
Code of 1870. Only in contracts which have as their essence the exchange of
values must there be the equivalent of a "consideration"--a price in money or
other values, whether material or in terms of promises of action or non-action.
See, for example, Arts. 1860. 2439, 2660, 2669, 2779, 2793, 2801, and 3071, and
contra.t with Arts. 2893 and 2894, 2910, 2926, 8035, and 8188.
9. Buckland and McNai-, Roman Law and Common Law (1986) 164, 167-171.
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phase of agency law sadly neglected in our legislation. The fidu-
ciary character of agency is treated in Articles 3003-3005 of the Civil
Code and the agent is clearly responsible for "unfaithfulness,"
"fault," and "neglect"; he must account for his management and
must even deliver to the principal whatever he has received "by
virtue of his procuration, even should he have received it unduly."
But it is clear that he is obligated only so long as he is agent, ° that
he may renounce the agency at any time," and that he is liable
only in damages for a renunciation prejudicial to the principal 2 or
for non-performance or fault or neglect in the performance of his
duty. 8 No text seems to provide the principal with the protection
afforded by the constructive trust against the agent who attempts to
renounce his agency so as to act for himself contrary to the interests
of the principal.
In its opinion the court at first avoided the question whether
the agent could renounce the agency and then act for himself. By
applying Article 2456"4 of the Civil Code, the court found Richard-
son had effectively "bought" the stock as soon as the agreement as
to the price had been reached with the seller, a time at which he
had not as yet renounced the agency. On this basis, apparently,
Sentell was considered owner of the stock from the moment Rich-
ardson and the seller had agreed on the price-a conclusion which
premises immediate transfer of interests to the principal in acts of
non-representative agency'-and, Martin's claim to the stock being
denied,'" Sentell was recognized as owner thereof. On application
for rehearing the defendants apparently contended that under the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act 7 an effective transfer could not have
been accomplished until delivery of the stock certificate. Though
this contention is very questionable," as if to meet the argument the
10. Art. 3002, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Art. 8031, La. Civil Code of 1870, supra note 4.
12. Ibid.
18. Arts. 8002-8008, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. Art. 2456, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The sale is considered to be perfect
between the parties, and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser with
regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for
the price thereof, although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price
paid."
15. A conclusion which renders the distinction between representative and
non-representative agency unimportant, as explained in the principal text, above.
16. See supra note 2.
17. La. Act 180 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1180-1205].
18. See the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, cited in note 17, above, § 4 [Dart's
Stats. (1989) § 1183], which implies the possibility of stock transfers other than
by delivery of the stock certificate except to the prejudice of third persons pur-
chasing and obtaining prior delivery of the certificate in good faith and without
notice.
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per curiam opinion denying a rehearing declares the court's decision
had been based on Richardson's inability "to purchase the stock for
his own benefit without having given his principal reasonable notice
of his intention to renounce the mandate," and on his acquisition
of the stock "as trustee for the account of his principal, who became
the rightful owner thereof."
Thus the supreme court resorted to the constructive trust in a
case in which it considered the agent to have acted in violation of
his fiduciary duty. The result is eminently fair and just, but the
theory of the case demonstrates the inadequacy of our legislation
in such situations. Perhaps a simpler solution would have been to
deny that a denunciation with the intention of acting contrary to
the interests of the principal can be effective and then to refuse to
consider any act of the agent as being in violation of his obligations.
In this way the constructive trust, with its non-civilian implications
of separation of legal and equitable title and of formalism as opposed
to substantivism in transactions, could be avoided.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
1. Denson Smith*
Although not many cases falling within this classification were
decided during the 1946-1947 session of the supreme court, there
were a few of more than passing interest.
A very interesting situation developed in the case of Mallet v.
Thibault.' An owner of two lots sold one to a Mrs. Rainey from
whom the plaintiff inherited. It was agreed that Mrs. Rainey should
have a servitude across the other lot for perpetual use as a driveway
to her garage. However, this agreement was not written into the
act of sale. Nevertheless, Mrs. Rainey and her tenant made use of
the servitude as intended. Subsequently, the owner entered into a
written agreement to sell the other lot to the defendant- This writ-
ing contained a recitation that the property was sold and purchased
subject to "vendor's previous agreement to allow owner and tenant
of house directly in rear use of driveway for entering and leaving
their garage." But again when the act of sale was accomplished,
this provision was not included therein. When plaintiff was there-
after notified to discontinue using the driveway, she filed this suit
against the purchaser and the original owner seeking judicial recog-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 81 So. (2d) 601 (La. 1947).
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